

DECLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

NSC/Soubers to Smith 09/06/2002
By lgr Date 02/06/07

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February 19, 1971

National Security Study Memorandum 120

TO: The Secretary of State
 The Secretary of Defense
 The Secretary of Commerce
 The Director of Central Intelligence
 The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
 The Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness
 The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
 The Director, Office of Science and Technology

SUBJECT: United States Policy on Peaceful Applications of
 Atomic Energy

The President has directed a review of United States policies and programs on peaceful applications of atomic energy. The review should include, but not be limited to, nuclear power and research reactors, fuel enrichment, fabrication and reprocessing technologies, peaceful nuclear explosions and controlled fusion research.

Generally, the review should clarify the purposes and scope of existing policies and discuss the major national security issues posed by interchange of nuclear technologies and equipment. Consideration should be given to how policies differ with respect to specific areas or countries.

The review should address specifically three areas of policy and the advantages and disadvantages of alternate approaches to each.

-- International Cooperation. Are the current policies governing U.S. cooperation with other nations and their access to new or advanced nuclear technologies, including the licensing, subsidy and promotion of nuclear exports, adequate to meet U.S. interests?

If not, what changes should be made in these policies?

The review should give full consideration to possible areas of increased international technical cooperation as well as international

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coordination of nuclear policies, particularly with the industrialized countries, relating to such matters as export controls and procedures, pricing arrangements, and environmental and safety aspects.

- International Safeguards. Considering probable expansion of future worldwide peaceful applications, are current bilateral and multilateral safeguard arrangements adequate to prevent deliberate diversion of special nuclear material?

If not, what policy options should be considered regarding the modification of U.S. procedures and technology controls or of the procedures of the International Atomic Energy Agency?

- Domestic Safeguards. Does the current U.S. system for safeguarding special nuclear materials in the custody of (a) the U.S. Government, (b) government contractors, and (c) private citizens and corporations provide assurance that such materials cannot be diverted to unauthorized use?

If not, what changes should be made in the U.S. system to assure against unauthorized use?

The President has directed that the review be conducted by an Ad Hoc Group, chaired by a representative of the Secretary of State and including representatives of the action and information addressees of this memorandum and of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Ad Hoc Group is authorized to establish the necessary subgroups to perform any special or technical reports.

The Ad Hoc Group should forward its report to the NSC Senior Review Group by July 1, 1971.



Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Chairman, Council on Environmental Quality
Administrator, Agency for International Development