Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

Conversation No. 100-1

Date: May 5, 1972

Time: Unknown between 12:00 am and 11:59 pm

Location: Cabinet Room

Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr. met with Dr. William O. Baker, Gordon Gray, Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr., Dr. Franklin D. Murphy, Frank Pace, Jr., Nelson A. Rockefeller, Dr. Edward Teller, Gerard P. Burke, Thomas Latimer, and Dr. Edward E. David, Jr.

[This segment was declassified on 02/28/2002.]

[National Security] [100-001-w001]

[Duration: 3m 54s]

Ships

- -Return
- -Troops
- -Inactivity
- -PMR [?]
- -Contractors
 - -Continuation [of war?]
- -Appropriations

Vietnam

- -Victory
 - -Methods
- -Ground communications
- -North Vietnamese offensive
 - -Duration
 - -Planning
 - -Advances
 - -Provincial capitals
 - -Location
 - -Losses

The President entered at 10:11 a.m.

Greetings

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

```
Edward Teller
     -Greetings
The President's schedule
     -Delay in meeting
Edward Teller
     -Sputnik
Report
The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board [PFIAB]
     -Meetings
           -Frequency
     -Importance of board
     -Recommendations
     -Missing members
           -Robert D. Murphy
                -Japan
           -Jim Lance [sp?]
                -Location
```

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number LPRN-T-MDR-2014-014. Segment declassified on 04/24/2019. Archivist: DR] [National Security]

[100-001-w001] [Duration: 54m 19s]

VIETNAM

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD [PFIAB]

MILITARY CAPABILITIES

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

Teller's presentation American leaders -Establishment -The President's actions -Timing -Vietnam -Media -Networks -University Presidents -Ivy League -Position on Vietnam -Texas A & M University -Position on Vietnam -Support for World War II -Influences -Businessmen -Press -Trade with Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] Union and People's Republic of China -Germany -Adolf Hitler -Position -Rockefeller -The President -"Old guard" leaders -World War II, Turkish loan, and Marshall Plan -Position -President's Board on Disarmament -John J. McCloy -General Lauris Norstad -Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT] -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] Union

-Unidentified Harvard University colleague of David

-US' expectations

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

```
[This segment was declassified on 02/28/2002.]
[National Security]
[100-001-w003]
[Duration: 50s]
    American leaders
          -Politicians
               -"Old guard" leaders
                    -Unidentified Harvard University colleague of David
                         -Position
                    -Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]
                         -Position
*********************************
     American leaders
          -Politicians
               -"Old guard" leaders
                    -Advice to the President
          -Religious leaders
              -John Cardinal Krol
                    -Terence Cardinal Cooke
              -William F. ("Billy") Graham
         -Educators
         -Religious leaders
         -Press executives
         -Politicians
              -Southern Democrats
                    -Position
                         -Republicans
                    -Advantages
                    -Richard B. Russell
                    -John C. Stennis
                    -John L. McClellan
                    -George H. Mahon
                    -F. Edward Hébert
         -Labor leaders
              -View of elite
              -Teamsters
```

-Meeting with the President

-Education

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

- -Frank E. Fitzsimmons
- -Joseph ("Joe T.") Trerotola
- -William J. McCarthy
- -Raymond Schoessling
- -George Meany
- -Position on Vietnam
- -Position on other issues
- -Elite class
 - -The President's experience
 - -"Georgetown set"
 - -International set
 - -Nassau, Bahamas
 - -Newport, Rhode Island
 - -Palm Beach, Florida
 - -Palm Springs, California
 - -Beverly Hills, California
 - -Westchester County, New York
 - -The President's experience
 - -Source of national weakness
 - -Education
- -Educators, publishers, communications executives, college administrators, and big businessmen
- -Small businessmen
- -Erosion
 - -The President's actions
 - -Students
 - -University Presidents and professors
 - -Influence
- -PFIAB contacts

[This segment was declassified on 02/28/2002.]

[National Security] [100-001-w004] [Duration: 1m 50s]

American leaders

- -The President's trip to People's Republic of China [PRC]
 - -Impact
 - -Taiwan
 - -Position of Leader class

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

```
-Chou en-Lai
                 -People's Republic of China [PRC] position
                      -Cold war
                 -Reason
                 -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] position
                 -People's Republic of China [PRC] position
                 -Leaders' opinion
                      -Expectations
                           -United Nations [UN]
*******************************
    PFIAB meeting
         -Value
    Current US situation
         -Senate
              -Antiballistic missile [ABM] appropriations
              -Teller
         -Democratic candidates
              -Henry M. ("Scoop") Jackson
              -Position on defense budget
         -Educational institutions
              -Harvard University
              -University of California
              -Ohio State University
              -Texas A & M University
              -Wyoming
         -H[erbert] G[eorge] Wells
              -Theory of decline of civilizations
                   -French
                   -British
                   -Romans
                   -Greeks
    Leader class
         -Influence on masses
              -Media
                   -Portrayal of US
```

-Influence on youth

-reason

-Mao Tse-tung

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

```
-Media
*********************************
[This segment was declassified on 02/28/2002.]
[National Security]
[100-001-w005]
[Duration: 4m 44s]
      Vietnam
           -US policies
                -Lyndon B. Johnson
                 -Dissent
                      -Withdrawal of US troops
                           -Consequences for South Vietnam
           -South Vietnam
                -1954 casualties
                      -Bishop of Da Nang
                -Possible future casualties
                      -US attitude
                           -India, Pakistan and Czechoslovakia
                 -US failure
                      -Consequences
           -Middle East
                 -Consequences of US failure in South Vietnam
                      -New York City and Tel Aviv
           -Western Europe
                -West Berlin and New York City
           -US stakes
                 -Communist goals
                      -People's Republic of China [PRC]
                 -Isolationism
                -Respect for US
           -US defeat
                -Consequences
                -Europe
                -Latin America
                -Africa
                -Japan and free Asia
```

-US withdrawal

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

```
US' spirit
     -Farmers
     -Southerners
     -Laborers
     -American leader class
           -Failures
                -Consequences
           -Meeting with "the people"
     -Values
           -Changes
     -Leaders
          -Change
          -Contrast with "the people"
          -Ivy League Presidents
     -The President's role
          -Relation with "the people"
     -Leaders
          -Ivy League
          -Response to change
                -Network heads
                -Newspaper heads
                -Reasons
     -Attica riot
          -Prisoners
          -Rockefeller's actions evaluated
          -The President's position
     -Leadership
          -The President
     -Open skies policy
          -Teller
          -First strike
          -United Nations
          -Position of "the people"
     -Leaders and "the people"
     -Newspapers
           -Newsday
                -Articles on the President and other leaders
                      -Reasons
```

-American people -New values

-Prospects for future

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

-The President ************************************ [This segment was declassified on 02/28/2002.] [National Security] [100-001-w005] [Duration: 1m 24s] The President's foreign policy -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]—People's Republic of China [PRC] -Impact -Position of "the people" -Position of great powers -Moscow -Peking -Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT] -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] capability *********************************** The President's foreign policy -Credibility -Leader class -Impact on the President -Compared with other twentieth century Presidents -Knowledge of media -Media -Position -Students -International group in Budapest -Position on Vietnam policy -Follow-up -Editors -Majority position -The President's meetings -Omaha World-Herald -Kansas City Star -[Forename unknown] McKnight

-Newsday

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

The President left at 11:37 am Meeting -Southern Democrats Schedule [Previous archivists categorized this section as unintelligible. It has been rereviewed and released 08/26/2019.] [Unintelligible] [100-001-w007] [Duration: 1m 34s] Meeting with William O. Baker [?] General conversation 30 million 6 years Vietnam -Black America

- -Troops
- -Leadership
 - -Robert S. McNamara
 - -Unidentified general
 - -Withdrawal of US' troops
 - -Loss of popular confidence
- -McNamara
- -General Maxwell D. Taylor
 - -New York Times
 - -Withdrawal of troops
 - -Timing
- -McNamara
- -New York Times
- -The President's policies
 - -Consequences in US

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

[Previous archivists categorized this section as unintelligible. It has been rereviewed and released 08/26/2019.]

[Unintelligible] [100-001-w008] [Duration: 41s]

General conversation

Anderson, et al. left at an unknown time before 11:59 pm

Conversation No. 100-2

Date: Unknown between May 5 and May 8, 1972

Time: Unknown between 11:37 am, May 5 and 9:10 am, May 8, 1972

Location: Cabinet Room

A tour group met

```
Cabinet Room
-Meetings
-Chairs
-Names
-Donald H. Rumsfeld
-Position
-John A. Volpe
-Position
-Seating Arrangement
-Secretary of the Treasury
-The President
-Secretary of Defense
-Secretary of State
-The Vice President
-Secretary of the Treasury
```

-Tradition on departure from office

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

```
-Portraits
```

-The President's choices

-Dwight D. Eisenhower

-[Thomas] Woodrow Wilson

-Theodore ("Teddy") Roosevelt

Stephen B. Bull

-Office location

H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman

-Office location

Alexander P. Butterfield

-Office location

The President's office

-Phone calls

-Butterfield's complaints

Rose Garden

-Tricia Nixon Cox's wedding

The tour group left at an unknown time before 9:10 am, May 8, 1972

Conversation No. 100-3

Date: Unknown between May 5 and May 8, 1972

Time: Unknown between 11:37 am, May 5 and 9:10 am, May 8, 1972

Location: Cabinet Room

A tour group met

Cabinet Room

-Importance

-Seating

-Arrangement

-Seniority of departments

-State

-William P. Rogers

-Department of Defense

-Department of Housing and Urban Development

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

-The Vice President
-Henry A. Kissinger
-Position
-Seating
-H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman
-John D. Ehrlichman
-Table
-Seating
-The President
-Portraits
-Dwight D. Eisenhower
-Theodore ("Teddy") Roosevelt
-[Thomas] Woodrow Wilson
-The President's choice
-Redecoration

The tour group left at an unknown time before 9:10 am, May 8, 1972

Conversation No. 100-4

Date: Unknown between May 5 and May 8, 1972

Time: Unknown between 11:37 am, May 5 and 9:10 am, May 8, 1972

Location: Cabinet Room

A tour group met

Cabinet Room
-The President's phone

The tour group left at an unknown time before 9:10 am, May 8, 1972

Conversation No. 100-5

Date: Unknown between May 5 and May 8, 1972

Time: Unknown between 11:37 am, May 5 and 9:10 am, May 8, 1972

Location: Cabinet Room

A tour group met

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

```
White House
     -West Wing
          -Construction
               -Theodore ("Teddy") Roosevelt
     -Previous location of the President's office
     -Oval Office
          -William H. Taft
     -West Wing
          -The President's staff
          -Press Office
                -Ronald L. Ziegler
     -Cabinet Room
          -Use
          -Chairs
                -Names and dates
          -Arrangements
          -Table
          -The President's chair
          -The Vice President
                -Seating
          -Seating arrangements
          -Portraits
                -Dwight D. Eisenhower, Theodore ("Teddy") Roosevelt, and [Thomas]
                     Woodrow Wilson
          -National Security Council [NSC] meetings
          -Telephone
```

The tour group left at an unknown time before 9:10 am, May 8, 1972

Conversation No. 100-6

Date: Unknown between May 5 and May 8, 1972

Time: Unknown between 11:37 am, May 5 and 9:10 am, May 8, 1972

Location: Cabinet Room

Unknown people met

```
Cabinet Room
-Meetings
-Cabinet
-Frequency
```

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

-Leadership

- -House and Senate members
- -Briefings

BEGIN WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

[Previous PRMPA Federal Statute (A) withdrawal reviewed 08/26/2019. Segment will remain closed.]

[Federal Statute] [100-006-w001] [Duration: 23s]

END WITHDRAWN ITEM NO. 1

The President's office

The unknown people left at an unknown time before 9:10 am, May 8, 1972

Conversation No. 100-7

Date: Unknown between May 5 and May 8, 1972

Time: Unknown between 11:37 am, May 5 and 9:10 am, May 8, 1972

Location: Cabinet Room

Ronald L. Ziegler met with a tour group

Cabinet Room

-Chairs

- -Names
- -The President
- -Secretaries of departments
- -The Vice President

Decision making -Economy

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

Souvenir paper

-Secretary of State

Cabinet Room

- -Carpeting
- -Ziegler's chair
- -Evaluated

Ziegler, et al. left at an unknown time before 9:10 am, May 8, 1972

Conversation No. 100-8

Date: Unknown between May 5 and May 8, 1972

Time: Unknown between 11:37 am, May 5 and 9:10 am, May 8, 1972

Location: Cabinet Room

A tour group met

Cabinet Room

-Seating

- -The President's chair
- -Secretaries of State and Defense
- -The Vice President
- -Table

-Cost

-Portrait

The tour group left at an unknown time before 9:10 am, May 8, 1972

Conversation No. 100-9

Date: Unknown between May 5 and May 8, 1972

Time: Unknown between 11:37 am, May 5 and 9:10 am, May 8, 1972

Location: Cabinet Room

George P. Shultz met with a tour group

Cabinet Room

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

-Table -Seating -Secretary of Labor

Shultz, et al. left at an unknown time before 9:10 am, May 8, 1972

Conversation No. 100-10

Date: Unknown between May 5 and May 8, 1972

Time: Unknown between 11:37 am, May 5 and 9:10 am, May 8, 1972

Location: Cabinet Room

General Alexander M. Haig, Jr. met with a tour group

Cabinet Room

- -Cabinet meetings
- -National Security Council [NSC] meetings
- -Chairs
 - -Seating
 - -The President
 - -The Vice President
- -Cabinet meetings
 - -Frequency
- -NSC meetings

Rose Garden

-Tricia Nixon Cox wedding

Haig, et al. left at an unknown time before 9:10 am, May 8, 1972

Conversation No. 100-11

Date: Unknown between May 5 and May 8, 1972

Time: Unknown between 11:37 am, May 5 and 9:10 am, May 8, 1972

Location: Cabinet Room

A tour group met

An antique

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

```
Cabinet Room
          -Seating
                -Nameplates on chairs
                -George W. Romney
                -Earl L. Butz
                -John B. Connally
                -The Vice President
                -Attorney General
          -Chairs
                -Departure of Secretaries
          -Secretary of Treasury
                -David M. Kennedy
          -George H. W. Bush
                -United Nations
Lieutenant [Forename unknown] Bridgeky [sp?] entered at an unknown time after 11:37 am,
May 5, 1972
     Introductions
     Bridgeky's work
Bridgeky left at an unknown time before 9:10 am, May 8, 1972
     The President's schedule
     Cabinet Room
          -Chairs
                -Arrangement
                     -The President and Vice President
                     -Oldest departments
                     -Defense, State, Attorney General, and Treasury
                          -Peter G. Peterson
          -Chairs on sides
                -Henry A. Kissinger
                -Robert H. Finch
                -H. R. ("Bob") Haldeman
                     -Duties
          -Portraits
          -Table
                -Donor
```

-Size

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

-Light

The tour group left at an unknown time before 9:10 am, May 8, 1972

Conversation No. 100-14

Date: Unknown between May 5 and May 8, 1972

Time: Unknown between 11:37 am, May 5 and 9:10 am, May 8, 1972

Location: Cabinet Room

A tour group met

Cabinet Room -Chairs

-Purchase

[Previous archivists categorized this section as unintelligible. It has been rereviewed and released 08/26/2019.]

[Unintelligible]

[100-014-w001] [Duration: 24s]

Cabinet Room -Question

Cabinet Room

-Chairs

-The President's chair

-Function

-Signing ceremonies

-The President's office

-Experience of unknown person

-Crowd

The tour group left at an unknown time before 9:10 am, May 8, 1972

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

Conversation No. 100-15

Date: Unknown between May 5 and May 8, 1972

Time: Unknown between 11:37 am, May 5 and 9:10 am, May 8, 1972

Location: Cabinet Room

A tour group met

Cabinet Room

-Function

-Press

-Seating

-Portraits

-Dwight D. Eisenhower

-[Thomas] Woodrow Wilson

-Theodore ("Teddy") Roosevelt

Roosevelt Room

Swimming pool

The tour group left at an unknown time before 9:10 am, May 8, 1972

Conversation No. 100-16

Date: Unknown between May 5 and May 8, 1972

Time: Unknown between 11:37 am, May 5 and 9:10 am, May 8, 1972

Location: Cabinet Room

A tour group met

Cabinet Room

-Chairs

-Nameplates

-Counselor to the President

Recording ends at an unknown time before 9:10 am, May 8, 1972

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

Conversation No. 100-18

Date: Unknown between May 5 and May 8, 1972

Time: Unknown between 11:37 am, May 5 and 9:10 am, May 8, 1972

Location: Cabinet Room

A tour group met

Cabinet Room

-Chairs

- -Nameplates
- -Counselor to the President
- -George P. Shultz

Recording ends at an unknown time before 9:10 am, May 8, 1972

Conversation No. 100-19

Date: Unknown between May 5 and May 8, 1972

Time: Unknown between 11:37 am, May 5 and 9:10 am, May 8, 1972

Location: Cabinet Room

Unknown men met

[Recording begins while the conversation is in progress]

[Previous non-historical (H) withdrawal reviewed under deed of gift 08/26/2019. Segment cleared for release.]

[Non-Historical] [100-019-w001]

[100-019-w001] [Duration: 6s]

Six months ago

Tape Subject Log (rev. 2/24)

Recording ends at an unknown time before 9:10 am, May 8, 1972

Conversation No. 100-20

Date: May 8, 1972

Time: Unknown after 12:00 am until 12:07 pm

Location: Cabinet Room

William P. Rogers met with unknown men

[Recording begins while the conversation is in progress]

[Previous non-historical (H) withdrawal reviewed under deed of gift 08/26/2019. Segment cleared for release.]

[Non-Historical] [100-020-w001] [Duration: <u>24s</u>]

Greetings

Travel

Recording ends at an unknown time before 12:07 pm

Conversation No. 100-17

Date: May 8, 1972

Time: Unknown after 12:00 am until 12:07 pm

Location: Cabinet Room

<u>Vice President Spiro T. Agnew met with William P. Rogers, Melvin R. Laird, General George A. Lincoln, John B. Connally, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Richard M. Helms, Henry A.</u>

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

Kissinger, General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., and John Negroponte.
[Recording begins while the conversation is in progress]

[Previous archivists categorized this section as unintelligible. It has been rereviewed and released 08/26/2019.] [Unintelligible] [100-017-w008] [Duration: 52s]
General conversation
Good news or bad news

[Previous non-historical (H) withdrawal reviewed under deed of gift 08/26/2019. Segment cleared for release.] [Non-Historical] [100-017-w002] [Duration: 51s]
Joke
-Surgeon

[Previous archivists categorized this section as unintelligible. It has been rereviewed and released 08/26/2019.] [Unintelligible] [100-017-w009] [Duration: 1m 10s]
[This portion of the tape is mostly room noise with some muffled background conversation.]

Tape Subject Log (rev. 2/24)

Week of May 14, 1972

[This segment was declassified on 02/28/2002.] [National Security] [100-017-w001] [Duration: 29s]
Vietnam -Mining operation -US losses -North Vietnamese losses

[Previous non-historical (H) withdrawal reviewed under deed of gift 08/26/2019. Segment cleared for release.] [Non-Historical] [100-017-w003] [Duration: 18s]
[This portion of the tape is mostly room noise with some muffled background conversation.]

[Previous PRMPA Personal Returnable (G) withdrawal reviewed under deed of gift 08/26/2019. Segment cleared for release.] [Personal Returnable] [100-017-w004] [Duration: 1m 22s]

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

```
Texas election
           -[First name unknown] Smith
                -Position
               -Percentage of votes
               -New economic program policy
               -Incumbent
               -Previous poll numbers
*******************************
The President entered at 9:10 am
    Greetings
******************************
[This segment was declassified on 02/28/2002.]
[National Security]
[100-017-w001]
[Duration: <u>1h 54m 15s</u>]
      Vietnam
           -Blockade
                -The President's decision
           -North Vietnamese offensive
                -South Vietnamese strengths
                    -US air support
                -South Vietnamese resistance
                -North Vietnamese weaponry
                    -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]s
                    -Quantity
                    -Quality
                    -Compared with weapons US supplies to allies
                -US air support
                -North Vietnamese weapons
                    -Tanks
                    -Guns
                -South Vietnam
                    -Strengths
                    -Weaknesses
```

-Hue

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

```
-III corps
     -Hue
           -Importance
     -Future of South Vietnam
     -US responses
           -Options
-Negotiations
-South Vietnam
     -US options
     -US withdrawal
           -Democrats' and Republicans' positions
           -Considerations
                 -Credibility
                       -Allies
                 -Domino theory
                       -Thailand
                       -Cambodia
                       -Laos
                 -Assessment of responsibility
                 -Effect on foreign policy
-US options
     -Diplomacy
           -Current status
                 -Henry A. Kissinger
                 -US peace offers
                       -North Vietnamese response
           -North Vietnamese proposal
                 -Nguyen van Thieu
                       -Future
           -Relation to military position
           -Communist position
           -US offers
-US military action
     -Air strikes
           -Aircraft
                 -Intensity
                 -Location
                       -Haiphong/Hanoi
                 -Effectiveness
                 -Use in South Vietnam
                       -Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
           -Effectiveness
```

-Blockade

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

- -Seaborne deliveries
 - -Impact
- -Railroads
 - -Bombing
 - -Impact on South Vietnam
 - -Compared to 1965 and 1968
- -Effect
- -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] summit
 - -Effect
 - -Importance
 - -Cancellation
 - -North Vietnamese position in Hue
 - -Likelihood
- -US options
 - -Withdrawal
 - -considerations
 - -Air strikes
 - -Level
 - -Consequences
 - -US public opinion
 - -Congressional action
 - -The President's choices
 - -Political factors
 - -Military situation
 - -Withdrawal
 - -Consequences
 - -Escalation
 - -Methods
 - -Impact on North Vietnam
 - -Impact on South Vietnam
 - -Decision
- -Thomas H. Moorer
- -Richard M. Helms
- -US military status
 - -Mining
 - -Types
 - -Ships
 - -Small craft
 - -Haiphong harbor
 - -Conditions
 - -Larger mines
 - -Effectiveness
 - -Haiphong harbor

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

- -Number of ships
- -Petroleum, oil and lubricants [POL] dump
- -Limit
 - -International law
 - -Department of State [DOS]
 - -Department of Defense [DOD]
 - -North Vietnamese claims
 - -U. Alexis Johnson's proposal
 - -Work
- -Placement of mines
 - -Time
 - -Action
 - -Time elapsed
 - -Method
 - -Losses
 - -Type of craft
 - -Possibilities
 - -Diversionary efforts
 - -Newport News
- -Activation
 - -Delay
 - -Timing
 - -De-activation
 - -Number of days
- -Alternative plans
 - -Considerations
- -Activation
 - -Detonation
 - -Sweeping
 - -Countermeasures
- -Moorings
 - -Red river
- -Activation of mines
 - -Delay
- -Areas of mining
 - -International limits
 - -Rivers
 - -Demilitarized Zone [DMZ]
 - -Duong Wang [sp] [?]
 - -Quang Khe [sp] [?]
 - -Sang Wah [sp] [?]
 - -Rivers
 - -Staging areas

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

-Reseeding mine fields

-Vankari pass supply line

```
-Considerations
                        -Suppressive actions
                              -Purpose
[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-014. Segment declassified on 04/24/2019. Archivist: DR
[National Security]
[100-017-w005]
[Duration: <u>57m 22s</u>]
       Vietnam
            -US military status
                  -Air strikes
                        -Rail yards
                              -Richard M. Helms's report
                              -Bridges
                                    -Hanoi area
                                   -Current status
                        -Number of sorties
                              -Current
                              -Location
                              -Change
                        -South Vietnamese operations
                              -Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
                              -Effect of action vs. North Vietnam
                              -US units
                                    -Saratoga
                        -Railroads
                        -Other supply points
                        -Demilitarized Zone [DMZ]
                  -Mining
                        -Withdrawal of ships
                  -Air strikes
                        -Warehouses
                        -Damage
                  -Mining
```

-Placement of mines -Level of risk

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

```
-Seaborne traffic
           -Destroyers
           -Surveillance
           -Routes
                 -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] ships
                 -Black sea
           -Warnings
           -Cargo
                 -Discharge
           -Warnings
           -Surveillance
           -Ships en route to Haiphong
                 -Cargo
-Richard M. Helms's report
     -Stockpiles
     -Logistics
-Air strikes
     -Rail lines
     -Docks
     -Warehouses
     -Ships
           -Location
     -Docks
     -Ships
           -Strikes in 1965 and 1968
                 -Effectiveness
                 -Planes used
                 -Rail lines
                      -Usage
                            -Time of day
                 -Planes
                      -Number compared with 1972
                      -Advantages compared with 1972
                      -Number of sorties
                 -Effectiveness
                      -Richard M. Helms
                            -1968 report
                 -Rails
                      -Usage
     -Petroleum, oil, and lubricants [POL] dumps
           -Capacity
           -Damage
                 -Supply on hand
```

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

-Effect on rails

-Effect

-1968 vs. 1972

-Sea and land simultaneously

-Mining

-Effectiveness

-Haiphong

-Offshore unloading

-Prevention

-Seaborne traffic

-Unloading

-Number of ships

-Surveillance

-Cessation

-Blockade

-Mining

-Blockade

-Interdiction

-Legality

-U. Alexis Johnson

-Mining

-Haiphong

-Air strikes

-Ships

-Activation of mines

-Time

-Warning

-Air strikes

-Docks

-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] ships in Haiphong

-Effect of mining

-Timing

-Impact on North Vietnamese war effort

-Time

-Materiel

-Food stuffs

-Military equipment

-Trucks

-Petroleum, oil, and lubricants [POL] supplies

-Supply lines

-Tanks

-Missiles

-Aircraft

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

```
-Missiles
           -Petroleum, oil, and lubricants [POL]
                 -Domestic supplies
                       -Rationing
                 -Air strikes' effect
-Air strikes
     -Targets
     -Number
     -Location
-Blockade
     -Mining
     -Air strikes
           -Level
           -Rail lines
           -Duration
                 -Hanoi and Haiphong
                       -Petroleum, oil, and lubricants [POL]
                       -Power plants
                       -Industries
     -Scope
           -Mining
                 -Advantages
           -Air strikes
                 -Rails
                 -Stockpiles
                 -Intensity
                 -Location
     -1968 operations
           -Motorized vehicles
           -Artillery
                 -Increases
                       -Tonnage
-South Vietnam
     -Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.'s position
     -Augmentation
           -Carriers
           -Destroyers
           -Squadrons
                 -Numbers
     -Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.'s position
           -Compared with 1968
     -B-52 strikes
```

-Intensity

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

```
-Air strikes
-Rail lines
-Effect
-J
```

-B-52's -Surface-to-Air Missile [SAM]

-Number fired

-Number of hits

-Hanoi area

-Number fired

-Mikoyan-Gurevich [MIG] lost

-Level

-Number fired in war

-Blockade

-Effectiveness

-Alternatives

-US Marines Corps [USMC] division

-Long Binh

-Likelihood

-Melvin R. Laird

-South Vietnamese effort

-Bombing increase

-Targets

-Air strikes around Hanoi

-Limits

-Ports and docks

-Red river

-Warehouses

-Effectiveness

-Restraints

-Considerations

-Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.

-Mining

-Impact

-Air strikes

-Petroleum, oil, and lubricants [POL]

-Blockade

-Richard M. Helms's report

-Melvin R. Laird's report

-The President's decision

-Time

-Planning

-William P. Rogers

-Melvin R. Laird

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

- -Nuclear possibility
 - -Denials by Ronald L. Ziegler
- -US Marine Corps [USMC]
 - -Uses
 - -Protection
 - -Da Nang
 - -Melvin R. Laird
 - -Offensive
 - -Defensive
 - -Public statements
- -Blockade
 - -Psychological impact
 - -Political impact
- -Withdrawal
 - -Impact
- -US forces
 - -Carriers
 - -B-52's
 - -Tactical Aircraft [TACAIR]
 - -Weapons for South Vietnam
 - -Increase
 - -Melvin R. Laird's report
- -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] summit
 - -Effect of military actions
 - -William P. Rogers's report
 - -Cancellation
 - -North Vietnamese offensive
- -North Vietnamese offensive
 - -Effect of US elections
 - -September-October attack
 - -Democratic choices
 - -John B. Connally's report
 - -George S. McGovern
 - -Hubert H. Humphrey
 - -Edward M. ("Ted") Kennedy
 - -North Vietnamese preferences
 - -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] preferences
- -US actions
 - -Timing
- -Congress
 - -Funding support
- -South Vietnamese survival
 - -Likelihood

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

```
-Timing
     -Impact on US foreign policy
     -Current US actions
           -Effectiveness
                 -Richard M. Helms
                      -Bay of Pigs
                 -Factors
           -Richard M. Helms's report
           -Bombing
                 -Haiphong-Hanoi area
                      -Considerations
                            -Targets
-Blockade
     -Intelligence estimates
     -Interdiction
           -Defined
     -Purpose
     -US goals
           -Closing of ports
           -Ho Chi Minh trail
     -North Vietnamese imports
           -Ships
                 -Percentage
                 -Haiphong
                 -Tonnage
           -Overland deliveries
                 -Tonnage
                 -Railroads in North Vietnam
                       -Capacity
           -Bombing
                 -Considerations
           -Military supplies
           -Rails
                 -Locomotives
                 -Freight cars
                 -Gauges
           -Trucks
                 -Inventory
-North Vietnamese logistic capacity
     -Dien Bien Phu assault
     -Ho Chi Minh trail
           -Supplies moved
                 -Purpose
```

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

-Military region III

-Blockade

- -Impact on imports
 - -Petroleum, oil, and lubricants [POL]
 - -North Vietnamese requirements
 - -People's Republic of China [PRC] stocks
 - -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] shipments through People's Republic of China [PRC]
 - -Tank cars required
 - -People's Republic of China [PRC] refineries
 - -Shanghai
 - -Lang Chou [sp] [?]
 - -Current supplies
 - -People's Republic of China [PRC] route
 - -Arrangements
 - -Stockpiles
 - -Resupply requirements
 - -Effect
 - -Seaborne imports
 - -Denial
 - -Impact in North Vietnam
 - -Impact in South Vietnam
 - -Laos and Cambodia
- -North Vietnamese response
 - -Military activity in South Vietnam
- -US domestic response
 - -Assessments
 - -North Vietnamese
 - -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
 - -People's Republic of China [PRC]
- -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] response
 - -Summit cancellation
 - -Timing
 - -Possible military action
 - -Minesweepers
 - -Propaganda
 - -Indochina
 - -Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT] I
 - -Trade prospects [?]
 - -Détente in Europe
 - -Berlin
 - -Cuba
- -People's Republic of China [PRC] response

Tape Subject Log

- -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] union
- -Relations with North Vietnam
- -1968 bombing
 - -Military support
- -Support for North Vietnam
- -US-People's Republic of China [PRC] relations
- -Political situation
- -Chou En-lai
 - -The President's trip to Peking
- -Non-communist nations' responses
- -North Vietnam-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] actions
- -Impact on North Vietnam
 - -Overland routes
 - -Seaborne imports
 - -Percentage and tonnage
 - -Logistical considerations
 - -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
 - -People's Republic of China [PRC]
 - -North Vietnamese political future
 - -Seaborne imports
 - -Losses
 - -Alternatives
 - -People's Republic of China [PRC]
 - -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
 - -Relations with US
 - -North Vietnamese concerns
 - -1954 settlement
 - -Logistical situation for North Vietnam
 - -Ports
 - -Overland routes
 - -Magnitude
 - -Possible consequences
 - -Resolution
 - -Manpower resources
 - -Resilience of North Vietnamese people
 - -North Vietnamese calculations of US domestic situation
 - -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] union
 - -North Vietnamese offensive
 - -South Vietnam
 - -Impact on military morale
 - -People characterized
 - -Impact on battlefield situation in South Vietnam
 - -Impact on Haiphong harbor

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

```
-North Vietnamese military actions
```

- -Negotiating position
 - -Prisoners of War [POWs]
- -South Vietnamese morale
- -North Vietnamese offensive
 - -Failure
 - -Impact of failure
 - -1968 Tet offensive comparison
 - -February, May, August 1969
 - -Impact on North Vietnam
 - -Impact on US policy
 - -Lyndon B. Johnson
 - -Impact on North Vietnam politburo
 - -Lau Dong [sp] [?]
- -North Vietnam politburo
 - -Effect of blockade
 - -Effect of US elections
 - -Effect of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] and

People's Republic of China [PRC] pressures on US

- -Military response
- -Alternatives
 - -Continuation of North Vietnamese and US policies
 - -Casualties
 - -Impact on rest of world
- -Richard M. Helms's evaluation
- -Alternatives
 - -Present policy
 - -Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] evaluation
 - -John B. Connally
 - -Effect on public opinion
 - -US
 - -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] union
 - -People's Republic of China [PRC]
 - -Richard M. Helms's report

Vietnam

-Blockade

-Bombing of Hanoi-Haiphong area

-Impact

-Melvin R. Laird's report

Tape Subject Log

```
-Alternatives
           -Current policy
                 -Consequences
     -Chance of success
-Possibility of US military defeat
     -Dunkirk comparison
     -Impact on US foreign policy
     -Risks
           -Political defeat
     -Averting defeat
           -Methods
     -Opposition
           -Doves
     -Need for action
-Blockade
     -Purpose
           -Remaining US forces
                 -Withdrawal
                      -Conditions
-South Vietnamese situation
     -Political
     -Military
           -1969
                 -1968 election issue in US
           -Regions I, II and III
                 -Reasons
           -Equipment
                 -Tanks
                      -Military region I
                      -m-48's
                      -T-54's
                      -Numbers
                      -T-54's
           -Artillery
                 -South Vietnamese action
                      -Marine spotters
                      -Equipment available
           -Tanks
                 -South Vietnamese
                 -North Vietnamese
                 -Losses
                 -Size
                 -Number
```

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

```
-Department of Defense [DOD] position
     -Artillery
           -John W. Vogt, Jr.'s report
           -South Vietnamese spotters
           -North Vietnamese spotters
           -Capacity to counteract
           -C-130 gunships
                -Effect on attacks
           -South Vietnamese spotters
                -Effectiveness
           -Quang Tri
                -Amount
                -Effect on South Vietnam forces
     -Hoang Xuan Lam
     -Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
           -Presentation to South Vietnamese military
                -Nguyen Van Thieu
-Outcome of war
     -US support
     -South Vietnamese military leadership
           -Importance
           -Needs
                -Duong Van ("Big Minh") Minh
                -Changes
     -Ground war
           -Importance
     -Blockade
           -Long-range impact
                -US elections
                -Impact on South Vietnam
                -Impact on US public opinion
                      -Duration
                -Impact on South Vietnam
                      -Time
```

US operations

- -Vietnam
 - -Investment
 - -Congressional funding
 - -Effect on military strength worldwide
 - -Impact on foreign and domestic policy
 - -Johnson administration
 - -Present administration

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

```
-US military strength in Europe
```

- -Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]
- -Opening of People's Republic of China [PRC]
- -1972 election issues
 - -Vietnam War
 - -European situation
 - -Southeast Asia

Vietnam

- -South Vietnamese performance
 - -Melvin R. Laird's and John B. Connally's assessments of prospects
 - -Alternative action
- -Military situation
 - -1968 offensive comparison
 - -Refugees in military region i
 - -Numbers in 1968 and 1972
 - -Expanded air strikes and blockade
 - -Impact on outcome of war
 - -Air strikes
 - -Number per day
 - -Railroads and bridges
 - -Construction work
 - -Repairs in Binh
- -Effect on US foreign policy
 - -John B. Connally's and Melvin R. Laird's views
- -South Vietnam
 - -US equipment and manpower
 - -Attitude
 - -US military equipment
 - -Types
 - -Costs
 - -Compared with blockade costs
 - -Amount
 - -Compared with 1968
 - -US ground force levels
 - -1968 vs. 1972
 - -Air strikes
 - -Locations
 - -Costs
 - -Single B-52 strike
 - -Effectiveness
 - -South Vietnam
 - -North Vietnam

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

```
-Possibility of collapse
           -Rate of collapse
           -Time
           -Effect
                 -US credibility
                 -Presidential credibility
     -Future US actions
     -Negotiations
           -Peace offer
           -Effect on US-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] relations
           -Possible Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] action
     -Possibility of defeat
           -Rate
           -Consequences
                 -US credibility
                       -Melvin R. Laird's statement
                 -World trade
                 -Middle East
                 -Indian Ocean
                 -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
                 -Wars of national liberation
                       -Domino theory
-Blockade and mining
     -Possible outcomes
           -Melvin R. Laird's assessment of South Vietnam strength
                 -Prisoners of War [POWs]
           -Warning to world
           -US position
                 -Japan
                 -Europe
     -Necessity for action
           -Americans
     -Alternatives
     -Effects
           -Political
           -South Vietnamese morale
           -North Vietnamese morale
```

US public opinion

- -South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Philippines
- -Japan
- -Middle East
 - -American Presidents' positions on Israel

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

```
-Europe
           -American Presidents' positions on Berlin and Bonn
           -Causes
                -Media campaign
     -US foreign vs. domestic policies
     -The President's 1968 campaign position
           -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR]
           -People's Republic of China [PRC]
     -Media attitude
           -Washington Post, New York Times, Time, and Newsweek
           -Networks
           -Columnists
           -Vietnam
                -Initial US involvement
                -Continuing involvement
                -Withdrawal
                -Isolationism
     -Effects
           -US power
                -Military
                -Diplomatic
                -Consequences
                      -Balance of power
                      -Non-communist nations and US allies
                      -US strength
                            -Necessity
                                  -Maintenance of balance of power
     -The President's task
Vietnam
     -Possible US defeat
           -Consequences
           -The President's critics
     -Air strikes
           -Impact
           -Deployment
                -Hue
                      -Creighton W. Abrams, Jr. and Thomas H. Moorer
                      -Importance
                            -Symbolism
                            -Compared with Verdun
           -B-52 strikes
```

-Intensity

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

```
-Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.'s use
           -Military regions I, II, III and IV
     -Deployment
           -Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
                 -Hue
                 -Demilitarized Zone [DMZ]
-Blockade
     -Advantages
           -US credibility
-Air strikes
     -Intensity
     -Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.
     -Deployment in South Vietnam
     -Previous Hanoi-Haiphong strikes
           -Number
                 -Reasons
                      -Diplomatic
                      -Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.'s position
                            -Melvin R. Laird
                            -The President
     -Implementation
           -Rate
           -Reasons
                 -Military position
                 -Element of surprise
                 -Domestic impact
           -Targets
           -Timing
                 -Warning
-Blockade
     -US credibility
           -US public opinion
                 -Laos, Cambodia, South Vietnam and Southeast Asia
           -The President's conduct of foreign policy
                 -Withdrawal
                       -Conditions
                 -Effect of defeat in South Vietnam
     -Effect
           -Short term
                 -Melvin R. Laird's and John B. Connally's positions
-Ground action
     -South Vietnamese role
```

-US actions in 1960's

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

```
-Effects
```

- -US withdrawal
 - -Method
 - -Signal to world
 - -Effect on US
- -Blockade of Haiphong harbor
 - -Necessity
- -Air strikes
 - -Hanoi, Haiphong and other military targets
 - -Damage to aggressor
- -South Vietnam
 - -Possibility of defeat
 - -The President's trip to People's Republic of China [PRC]
 - -View of North Vietnam
 - -Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam invasions
 - -Damage
- -Repercussions
 - -North Vietnam
 - -Pakistan
 - -Bangladesh
 - -South Vietnam
 - -Southeast Asia
 - -Middle East
 - -Egypt
 - -Israel
- -Possibility of victory
 - -John B. Connally's opinion of South Vietnamese chances
- -Repercussions
 - -US withdrawal
 - -Effect on US credibility
 - -Risks
 - -Rate

US

- -Need for leadership
 - -Appeal of George C. Wallace and George S. McGovern
- -National Security Council [NSC]
 - -Opinions
 - -The President
 - -William P. Rogers
- -Choices
 - -The President's decision
 - -Time

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

```
-Influence of National Security Council [NSC] discussion
            -Foreign policy
                 -William P. Rogers's evaluation
                 -Richard M. Helms's evaluation
                 -Consequences
                      -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] union
                            -Response
                      -German treaty
                 -US relations
                      -Latin America
                      -Europe
                      -People's Republic of China [PRC]
                      -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] union
                            -Henry A. Kissinger's trip
                            -Dealings with North Vietnam
                            -Incentive
                                 -Cut off of supplies
                            -Influence on North Vietnam
                            -Impact of blockade
      Vietnam
            -Possibility of South Vietnamese defeat
                 -Impact on US foreign policy
            -Blockade
                 -US public opinion
                 -Impact on South Vietnam
                      -John B. Connally
                 -Compared with Lyndon B. Johnson's actions
                      -Effectiveness
************************
[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-014. Segment declassified 04/24/2019. Archivist: DR
```

[National Security]

[100-017-w006] [Duration: 4m 37s]

Vietnam

-Blockade

-Military situation in South Vietnam -Lyndon B. Johnson

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

- -Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] assessments
- -Military effect
- -Psychological impact
 - -South Vietnam
 - -Fight and survive
- -Effect
 - -South Vietnam
 - -Domestic
 - -Rest of world
- -Decision compared with bombing of Haiphong
- -US allies' opinion
 - -Great Britain
 - -West Germany
 - -Belgium
 - -Other allies
- -US public opinion
 - -Importance in upcoming months
- -Impact
 - -Petroleum, oil, and lubricants [POL] supplies
 - -Railroads
 - -Alternate routes
 - -Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] assessments
- -Possibility of failure
 - -Consequences
- -Effectiveness
 - -Military
 - -Congress
 - -Diplomatic negotiations
- -William P. Rogers's position
- -Decision
 - -Time

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] summit

- -North Vietnamese views
- -Cancellation
 - -Likelihood
- -Conditions for the President's visit
 - -Bombing
- -Cancellation
 - -Responsibility

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

```
-Effect
      Vietnam
           -Blockade
                -Effect
                      -Hue
                           -Importance
                           -1968 fall
                           -Media symbolism
                           -Effect on South Vietnamese morale
                -Effectiveness
                      -Air strikes
                           -Compared with 1967/68
                      -Alternate routes for supplies
                      -North Vietnamese supplies
                           -1965-68
[Previous National Security (B) withdrawal reviewed under MDR guidelines case number
LPRN-T-MDR-2014-014. Segment declassified 04/25/2019. Archivist: DR]
[National Security]
[100-017-w007]
[Duration: 32s]
      Vietnam
           -Blockade
                -Effectiveness
                      -North Vietnamese supplies
                           -1965-1968
                                -Intelligence
                           -Sihanoukville
                           -Railroads
                           -Roads
*************************
```

Vietnam
-Blockade
-Effectiveness
-North Vietnamese supplies

Tape Subject Log

(rev. 2/24)

```
-Seaborne supplies
```

- -Air strikes
 - -Overland routes
 - -Alternate routes
 - -Railroad sizes and time of day
 - -Supplies on hand
- -Effect
- -South Vietnamese defeat
 - -Timing
 - -Consequences
- -Effectiveness
 - -Short term
 - -Long range
- -South Vietnamese defeat
 - -Effect of blockade and air strikes
 - -Political consequences
 - -US election
 - -Democratic candidates
 - -Responsibility for North Vietnamese offensive
 - -Responsibility for US presence in South Vietnam
 - -Responsibility for US failure to withdraw
 - -Speech by the President
 - -Likelihood
 - -Effect of US training methods
 - -Reflection of society's values
 - -North Vietnamese performance
 - -Effect of US training methods in South Vietnam
- -Blockade
 - -Factors
 - -Doves

-Position on Prisoners of War [POWs]

- -Prisoners of War [POWs]
 - -Release
 - -Red Cross and United Nations [UN]
 - -North Vietnamese conditions
 - -Effect of blockade
 - -Conditions
 - -Laos, Cambodia and Thailand
- -Possible South Vietnamese defeat
 - -Responsibility
 - -Doves
 - -Consequences
- -Blockade

Tape Subject Log

- -Choices for US
 - -Withdrawal
 - -Consequences of failure
- -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] summit
 - -Conditions for the President's visit
 - -Influence on North Vietnam
 - -People's Republic of China [PRC]
 - -Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT] agreement
 - -Trade credits
 - -Space exploration agreement
 - -Mutual coexistence agreement
 - -The President's meeting with Leonid I. Brezhnev
 - -Timing
 - -US military actions
 - -Benefits at summit
 - -Likelihood of cancellation
- -The President's decision
- -Impact on South Vietnam
- -Melvin R. Laird, John B. Connally and William P. Rogers
 - -Advice to the President
- -Effect on military situation
- -Negotiations
 - -North Vietnamese position
- -US position in conduct of foreign policy
 - -South Vietnamese role
 - -South Vietnamese capabilities
 - -US equipment
 - -Cost
 - -The President's orders
 - -Cost
 - -Effect of US withdrawal
 - -Numbers of troops
 - -Popular and congressional support
 - -Timing
 - -Aid to South Vietnam
 - -Cost and usage
- -Blockade and bombing
 - -Impact on North Vietnam
 - -Haiphong harbor
 - -Docks
 - -Petroleum, oil, and lubricants [POL]
 - -Railroads
 - -North Vietnamese supplies

Tape Subject Log

- -Amount
- -Effectiveness of US Navy [USN] and US Air Force [USAF]
- -Previous attempts
- -Psychological impact on North Vietnam
- -Impact on South Vietnam
 - -Political
 - -Psychological
- -South Vietnamese training
 - -Evaluated
 - -Compared with North Vietnamese training
 - -An Loc example
- -Blockade and air strikes
 - -Effectiveness
 - -US public opinion
 - -Support
 - -Consequences
- -Military situation
 - -Melvin R. Laird's report
 - -Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.'s reports
 - -The President's response to Nguyen Van Thieu
 - -South Vietnamese forces
 - -North Vietnamese offensive
 - -Provincial capitals
 - -Number
- -Blockade and bombing
 - -The President's decision
 - -Time
 - -Speech
 - -Importance
 - -Support from National Security Council [NSC]
 - -John B. Connally
 - -Leaks
 - -Implementation
 - -Intensity
 - -Effects
 - -Unknown National Security Council [NSC] member's trip
 - -William P. Rogers's situation
 - -Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] summit
 - -Melvin R. Laird and the Spiro T. Agnew
 - -North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] ministers meeting
 - -Factors
 - -Melvin R. Laird's analysis
 - -Creighton W. Abrams, Jr.'s situation

Tape Subject Log (rev. 2/24)

-Advantages
-The President's speech